Consider the problem that consists in maximizing the revenue generated by tolls set on a subset of arcs of a transportation network, and where origin-destination flows are assigned to shortest paths with respect to the sum of tolls and initial costs. In this work, we address the instance where toll arcs must be connected, as occurs on highways. Our main results are concerned with the theoretical complexity of the problem and its variants, the design of valid inequalities, and facet description for the single commodity case.
The bilevel Network Pricing Problem was first introduced by Labbé et al [15] . Consider a multicommodity network defined by a node set N , an arc set A ∪ B and a set of origin-destination pairs
k ∈ K}, called commodities, each one endowed with a demand η k . Let A be a subset of arcs a upon which tolls t a can be added to the original fixed cost vector c and B the complementary subset of toll free arcs, for which the cost vector c is also given. Assuming that, for a given toll policy t = (t a ) a∈A , network users travel on shortest paths with respect to the toll and fixed cost structure, the Network Pricing Problem consists in devising a revenue maximizing toll policy. Upon the introduction of vectors x k that represent the flows on commodities (equivalently, origin-destination pairs) k ∈ K, the Network Pricing Problem can be formulated as the bilevel program (Labbé et al. [15] ):
(TP) max t,x k∈K a∈A η k t a x k a subject to:
x ∈ arg min 
subject to:
0 ≤ x k a ≤ 1 ∀k ∈ K, ∀a ∈ A,
where i − (resp. i + ) denotes the set of arcs having node i as their head (resp. tail).
It has been shown, even under restrictive conditions (see Roch et al. [17] , Grigoriev et al. [10] , Guruswami et al. [11] ) that the Network Pricing Problem is strongly NP-hard.
This problem and some of its variants have been further analyzed by Brotcorne et al. [2] , Bouhtou et al. [1] , van Hoesel et al. [18] , Grigoriev et al. [10] , Heilporn et al. [12] and Dewez et al. [6] . It is also closely related to the problem known as Product Line Design in the economic litterature. See Green and
Krieger [9] , Dobson and Kalish [7, 8] , Kohli et al. [13, 14] or Shioda et al. [16] for further details.
Network Pricing with Connected Toll Arcs
Set of origin and
Set of entry and exit nodes destination nodes The Network Pricing Problem with Connected Toll Arcs ("NPP") deals with structured networks in which all toll arcs must be connected and define a path. As those special structures can represent features specific to a real highway topology and in order to clarify the following of this paper, we define a highway as the set of all connected toll arcs in a network. We also define a commodity as a set of users with the same origin and destination nodes. A commodity can either take the shortest toll free path from its origin to its destination, or follow the highway, using shortest toll free paths fo and from the highway. We assume that users are not allowed to reenter the highway, which implies that paths are uniquely determined by their respective entry and exit nodes.
This problem is the "Basic NPP". It is illustrated in Figure 1 , where toll arcs are dashed. Toll free arcs are inserted between origin and destination nodes, and from the origin and destination nodes to the highway. We also assume that a fixed cost is set on each arc, corresponding to a measure of the distance, time or gas consumed on this arc. The fixed cost set on a toll free arc corresponds to the smallest fixed cost of a path between its nodes. Note that the above mathematical formulation (TP) applies to this situation. However, we need to define the set N ⊆ N of origin and destination nodes, and constraints
k must be added to (TP) in order to insure that a commodity which leaves the highway at some exit node do not reenter the highway at another entry node.
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Figure 2: Complete Toll NPP
We also consider the Network Pricing Problem with Connected
Toll Arcs involving a complete toll subgraph. This problem is depicted in Figure 2 and called "Complete Toll NPP", and allows the modelling of scale economies, as we will see below.
Let us now introduce some notation. For each arc a ∈ A, let t(a), h(a) ∈ N be its tail and head nodes respectively. For each commodity k ∈ K and for each toll arc a ∈ A, let c Economies of scale, that arise naturally in some contexts, are represented by the triangle and monotonicity inequalities (5), (6) . Parts of the network on which those inequalities apply are illustrated in Figure 3 . Monotonicity inequalities (6) , that imply that the toll on a path cannot be less than the toll of any subpath, are labeled 'Mono inequalities'. Under these additional constraints, one obtains the following formulation (see Dewez [5] and Weisgerber [20] ):
subject to constraints (5), (6) and:
x ∈ arg min
The lower level problem can be replaced by its primal and dual constraints and primal-dual optimality conditions, yielding a single-level program involving complementarity (i.e., disjunctive) constraints. Note that the characterization of lower level solutions as origin-destination paths carrying either no flow or the total origin-destination flow allows us to obtain an integer programming formulation of (HP1) that involves binary variables. Further, in order to obtain a linear model, variables
0 otherwise are introduced, corresponding to the actual unit profit associated with arc a ∈ A and commodity k ∈ K.
This yields (HP2) max
where M While the lower level optimality conditions in (HP2) involve arc-flow variables, an alternative is to express the optimality of the lower level problem in terms of path flows, without resorting to dual variables. The optimality conditions (12), (13) and (14) of (HP2) are then replaced by the equivalent
The second family of constraints is obviously redundant by constraints (11), (15) 
In the sequel, we consider two variants of the 'complete' version of the problem. In the 'General
Complete Toll NPP', tolls are independent, while the 'Constrained Complete Toll NPP' imposes triangle and monotonicity constraints (5) and (6), respectively.
Complexity
It has been shown by Dewez [5] that the Network Pricing Problem with Connected Toll Arcs is polynomially solvable when either a single commodity or a single toll arc is involved. In contrast,we prove that the Constrained Complete Toll NPP is NP-hard, using a reduction from 3-SAT.
Proposition 1
The single directional Constrained Complete Toll NPP is strongly NP-hard.
Proof 1
Any conjunctive normal form For each variable x i : i ∈ {1, ..., n}, a subnetwork is constructed as shown in Figure 4 . Each of these subnetworks contains three commodities (o ij , d ij ) : j ∈ {1, 2, 3} with unit demand, and two toll arcs a i , a i of zero fixed cost corresponding to the truth and false assignment for variable x i respectively. Further, in any subnetwork, an arc is added from the tail node of arc a i to the head node of arc a i , which corresponds to a i ∩ a i . Toll free arcs of cost zero connect o i1 (resp. o i3 ) to the tail node of arc a i (resp. a i ), the head node of
, o i2 to both tail nodes of toll arcs, and both head nodes of toll arcs to
of cost 2 are also added. Hence an upper bound on the revenue for each subnetwork is 7, obtained by setting to 2 the toll on either a i or a i and the other ones to 3. In all other cases, the revenue cannot exceed 6.
Note that the toll of 3 on the arc a i ∩ a i ensures that this arc is never taken. Indeed, suppose that commodity i2 chooses this arc a i ∩ a i (there is no path using this arc for commodities i1 and i3). As the revenue on i2 is bounded by a toll free arc of cost 2, the toll on the arc a i ∩ a i must be smaller or equal to 2. But then, due to the monotonicity constraints added to the problem, tolls on the other two arcs of the subnetworks cannot exceed 2 and the maximal revenue of 7 cannot be reached, which is a contradiction. Also note that the toll free arcs that do not appear from some origins to tail nodes of toll arcs (resp. from head nodes of toll arcs to some destinations) are supposed to be so expensive that they can never be used and they are not depicted in the network graph.
Then the subnetworks are linked together so that the single directional highway corresponds to the set of all connected subnetworks. Suppose there exists a satisfying truth assignment, which means that at least one literal is true in each clause. We set the corresponding tolls to 2, and the other tolls (in the corresponding subnetworks) to 3. Then the total revenue from all clause-commodities is 2m. For all remaining subneworks, if any (i.e.
this situation only happens if a variable x i does not appear in any clause), the toll arcs are set arbitrarily to 2 and 3 for a variable and its negation respectively. Hence the revenue from all subnetworks is 7n, which means that the total revenue is 2m + 7n.
Conversely, suppose there exists tolls such that the total revenue is 2m + 7n. The maximal possible revenue from all subneworks is 7n, only achievable by setting one toll per subnetwork to 2 and the other ones to 3. On the other hand, the maximal possible revenue from all clause-commodities is 2m. We set to true the literals corresponding to arcs with toll 2, and to false the others. This corresponds to a well-defined assignment for F , since there is exactly one toll of 2 in each subnetwork. Further, each clause-commodity contributes to the total revenue with a toll of 2, which means that at least one literal per clause is true, and there exists a truth assignment for F .
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Proposition 2 The bi-directional Constrained Complete Toll NPP is strongly NP-hard.
Proof 2
As toll arcs can now appear in both direction of the highway, subnetworks for variables x i : i ∈ {1, ..., n} are constructed in a slightly different way, as shown in Figure 6 (left). We consider that toll arcs 
a i : i ∈ {1, ..., n} are in one direction of the highway, while toll arcs a i : i ∈ {1, ..., n} are in the other direction.
Further, for each clause-commodity and as for the single directional graph, if two or three connected and with same direction (in the highway graph) toll arcs are in the same clause-commodity, toll arcs are added between the corresponding entry and exit nodes of the network. Such a network is depicted in Figure 6 (right). As the users are supposed to choose one direction or the other of the highway, no toll arc is added between the tail node of a toll arc in one direction of the highway network to the head node of another toll arc in the other direction of the highway network.
Then the same argument as before can be applied.
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Proposition 3 The bi-directional Constrained Complete Toll NPP is strongly NP-hard, even if access to all entry points (resp. from all exit points) is feasible from all origins (resp. to all destinations).
Proof 3
This additional condition means that no path is so expensive that it could never be taken, which is a little different from the situation described before. Subnetworks are constructed as before, except that some additional toll free arcs (those that were too expensive) are added so that there is one toll free arc from any origin to any tail node of a toll arc, and from any head node of a toll arc to any destination. For each commodity k, the cost on those arcs (o k , tail(a i )) and (head(a i ), d k ) are set in a way such that the sum of the fixed cost of these two arcs is equal to the cost of the toll free arc (o k , d k ). Such a subnetwork is depicted in Figure 7 . Hence those new arcs can only be chosen if tolls are set to zero on the corresponding arcs, which does not lead to a maximal revenue for the leader.
Hence tolls are set as before and the same argument can be applied.
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For space considerations, we omit the proof that the Basic NPP is also NP-hard.
Valid inequalities
In this section, we present some new valid inequalities for the Constrained Complete Toll NPP.
Proposition 4 ('Short inequalities') Inequalities
where k ∈ K, a ∈ A and S is any subset of A (possibly the empty set), are valid for the Constrained Complete Toll NPP and General Complete Toll NPP.
Proof 4
Let k ∈ K, a ∈ A and S ⊆ A be fixed. If 
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For a given commodity k ∈ K and a given toll arc a ∈ A, either the cost of the optimal path is equal to Note that similar valid inequalities, involving the toll free arcs (o k , d k ) : k ∈ K instead of the toll arcs a ∈ A, can be constructed as:
However, those inequalities can be equivalently written as:
∀k ∈ K, ∀a ∈ A, ∀S ⊆ A, which are redundant by (23).
Any choice for the set S being valid, the number of inequalities (28) is exponential. Thus, an efficient separation procedure is required. Let (t,p,x) be a current fractional solution of (HP3). The separation problem consists in determining, for each commodity k ∈ K, a toll arc a ∈ A and a subset S of A such that the corresponding inequality (28) is the most violated, i.e. minimizing the right hand side of this inequality. Let us restrict our attention to inequalities such that c
We will see later that this is sufficient, as only those last inequalities are facet defining for the convex hull of solutions of (HP3).
For each commodity k ∈ K, the separation procedure goes as follows. First, we sort the toll arcs so
where n is the number of toll arcs in the network. As our goal is to construct a right hand side of (28) as small as possible, let us consider, for a given toll arc a, the toll arcs b in A \ (S ∪ {a})
for whichp
Each toll arc b ∈ A is assigned to a node of a singly-linked list so that the corresponding values Then, for each toll arc a going from 1 to n, we construct the set A \ S sequentially in order to obtain the smallest value for the right hand side of inequalities (28) corresponding to commodity k. Note that the smallest right hand side values of (28) do not differ very much from a given toll arc a to the next one a + 1 (in terms of increasing order of the corresponding fixed costs). Indeed, if b ∈ A \ S for a given toll arc a, then b ∈ A \ S for the next toll arc a + 1 by (29). The complexity of the separation procedure is dominated by that of the sorting operation, and can therefore be performed in O(n log n). Now, for every a ∈ A, we define the sets
The corresponding parts of network are depicted in Figure 8 . If Triangle and Mono inequalities are included, toll variables must satisfy t a ≥ t b for all b in C a .
Note that an arc b is in C a if and only if a is in C b .
We also define an elementary arc as a toll arc a ∈ A such that h(a) = t(a) + 1 or h(a) = t(a) − 1. The set of all elementary arcs is denoted A E , i.e. 
where b * is the arc with the smallest fixed cost in C a ∩ A E , are valid for the Constrained Complete Toll NPP and the General Complete Toll NPP.
Proof 5
Let a ∈ A be fixed and suppose that t(a) < h(a). If x b = 0 for every toll arc b ∈ C a ∩ A E , then (30) becomes t a ≥ t b which is valid by the Mono inequalities (6) . Otherwise, i.e. if x b = 1 for a toll arc b ∈ C a ∩ A E , then (30) becomes
Since inequalities t a ≥ t b * and t b + c b ≤ t b * + c b * hold, the first due to (6) and the second because the cost of the path containing toll arc b is smaller than the cost of any other path, it follows that (30) holds.
For each commodity k ∈ K, the separation procedure for inequalities (30) is in O(n 3/2 ). For a ∈ A fixed, one may find the toll arc b ∈ C a ∩ A E with minimal fixed cost in O(n 1/2 ). Indeed, as a highway network with m entry and exit nodes yields to n = m(m − 1) toll arcs among which 2(m − 1) elementary toll arcs, the number of elementary toll arcs is in O(n 1/2 ). Then, according to the current solution (t,p,x) of (HP3), one looks for the largest right hand side value of the corresponding inequalities (30), and then checks whether this value is larger than the value for t a .
Single commodity Problems
The single commodity case is polynomially solvable [5] . Indeed, the toll arc yielding to the largest revenue for the leader, i.e. with the largest upper bound M k a : a ∈ A, can be found in O(n). The toll on this arc is set to its upper bound, while tolls on the other arcs are set to sufficiently large values. Note that, in this case, constraints (24) can be removed from the model (HP3).
While it is known that the single commodity case is polynomially solvable, yet its analysis provides some insight. This Section aims to highlight several facets of the convex hull of (HP3) First we focus on the Constrained Complete Toll NPP with a single commodity and, for notational simplicity, remove the index k. Let us denote by P C the convex hull of feasible solutions for the Constrained Complete Toll NPP, i.e.
where n is the number of toll arcs.
We impose that c a ≤ c od for all a in A as if a toll arc a ∈ A is such that c a > c od , the corresponding path is never used and the arc a ∈ A can be removed.
Proposition 6 Let a, b ∈ A be two toll arcs of the network such that b ∈ C a . If the corresponding fixed costs are such that c b < c a , then x a = 0 and the corresponding path is never used.
Proof 6
The cost of the first path using b ∈ A is c b + t b , and the cost of the second path using a ∈ A is c a + t a .
As the Mono inequalities impose that t a ≥ t b , the cost of the second path is always larger than the cost of the first path.
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In what follows, the toll arcs which are never used are removed and and the set A is modified accordingly. We introduce a scalar M such that M > c od − c a for all a ∈ A. Further, let M a = max{0, c od − c a } as defined in (HP3), and denote by e a a unit vector in the direction a. We also denote by 1 a vector with all coordinates equal to 1.
Throughout the analysis, we assume that the arcs are totally ordered (labels 1 to n) in a manner that is compatible with the partial order induced by the Mono and Triangle inequalities. More specifically, the coordinates of toll arcs are such that if b ∈ C a for some couple a, b ∈ A, i.e. the corresponding tax variables satisfy t a ≥ t b , then a has a smaller index (also denoted "a") than b.
Proposition 7
The polyhedron P C has full dimension, i.e. Dim P C = 3n.
Proof 7
Suppose by contradiction that the points P C lie on a generic hyperplane αt + βp + γx = δ. The points (M 1; 0; 0) and M 1 + b∈A:b≤a e b ; 0; 0 belong to P C for all a ∈ A. It follows that
thus α a = 0 for all a ∈ A and δ = 0. Further, the points M (1 − b∈C a e b ) + b∈A:b<a e b ; 0; e a and
M a e a ; e a are in P C for all a ∈ A, thus γ a = 0 = β a for all a ∈ A and the result follows.
One can also prove that several (HP3) inequalities are facet defining for P C . Let (t; p; x) be points of P C . In order to prove that a given inequality is facet defining for P C , we define H as the hyperplane induced by a given inequality, and G as a generic hyperplane defined by αt + βp + γx = δ. Hence we select points of P C ∩ H and we deduce that G = H.
Proposition 8 The inequalities
with M a = max{0, c od − c a }, are facet defining for P C .
Proof 8
For all a ∈ A, we consider the points M (1 − b∈C a e b ); 0; e a and M (1 − b∈C a e b ) + b∈A:b<a e b ; 0; e a of P C ∩ H. This yields to
Hence α a = 0 and γ a = δ for all a ∈ A. Next, points M 1 + (M a − M ) b∈C a e b ; M a e a ; e a are also in P C ∩ H for all a ∈ A. Hence β a = 0 for all a ∈ A.
(ii) Let H = {(t; p; x) : p e a = M e a x e a , a ∈ A}.
Points (M 1; 0; 0) and M 1 + b∈A:b≤a e b ; 0; 0 are in P C ∩ H for all a ∈ A, which implies that
thus α a = 0 for all a ∈ A and δ = 0. Points M (1 − b∈C a e b ); 0; e a also belong to P C ∩ H for all a ∈ A such that a = a, and γ a = 0 for those a ∈ A. As M 1 + (M a − M ) b∈C a e b ; M a e a ; e a are in P C ∩ H for all a ∈ A, it follows that β a = 0 for all a ∈ A such that a = a and γ e a = −M e a β e a .
The result follows.
(iii) Let H = {(t; p; x) : p e a = 0, a ∈ A}.
Points (M 1; 0; 0) and M 1 + b∈A:b≤a e b ; 0; 0 are in P C ∩ H for all a ∈ A, thus α a = 0 for all a ∈ A and δ = 0. As M (1 − b∈C a e b ); 0; e a also belong to P C ∩ H for all a ∈ A, it follows that γ a = 0 for all a ∈ A. Finally, the points M 1 + (M a − M ) b∈C a e b ; M a e a ; e a are in P C ∩ H for all a ∈ A such that a = a, thus β a = 0 for all a ∈ A such that a = a and the result follows.
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Proposition 9
The triangle inequalities
are facet defining for P C .
Proof 9
Let H = (t; p; x) :
that the index are so thatb <c. The point M (1 + b∈A:b≤ã e b ); 0; 0 belongs to P C ∩ H, wich implies
For all a ∈ A \ {ã}, points M (1 + b∈A\{ã}:b≤a e b ) + Seã; 0; 0 are in P C ∩ H with S = M for a <b, S = 2M forb ≤ a <c, and S = 3M for a ≥c. It follows that
From the first case a <b we know that α a = 0 (for a =ã) ; from the second one we conclude that αã = −αb and that the other index α a = 0 ; from the last one we obtain αã = −αc and α a = 0 for the other index. Hence δ = 0.
Further, for all a ∈ A such thatã,b,c ∈ C a , the points M (1 + b∈Cã e b − b∈C a e b ); 0; e a belong to P C ∩ H. In those point coordinates, the first sum ensures that the given Triangle inequality holds at equality, while the second sum ensures that t a = p a (as imposed by (23), (24), (25) in (HP3)) and that the Mono inequalities hold. For all a ∈ A such that eitherã orb orc in C a , the points M (1 − b∈C a e b ); 0; e a are in P C ∩ H. Hence γ a = 0 for all a ∈ A.
Next, for all a ∈ A such thatã,b,c ∈ C a , one considers points
M a e a ; e a of P C ∩ H. Otherwise, i.e. if eitherã orb orc is in C a , the points
M a e a ; e a are in P C ∩ H. This yields β a = 0 for all a ∈ A and the result follows.
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Proposition 10
The Mono inequalities
are facet defining for Figure 10 ).
Proof 10
Let H = (t; p; 
From the first case a <b we know that α a = 0 (for a =ã) ; from the second one we conclude that αã = −αb and that the other index α a = 0. Hence δ = 0.
Further, for all a ∈ A, points M (1 − b∈C a ∪Cã e b ); 0; e a are in P C ∩ H. Note that imposing t b = 0 for all b ∈ Cã allows that the given Mono inequality holds at equality when a is so thatb ∈ C a . This implies that γ a = 0 for all a ∈ A.
Finally, for all a ∈ A such thatã,b ∈ C a , one considers points M 1 + (M a − M ) b∈C a e b ; M a e a ; e a of P C ∩ H. Otherwise, i.e. whenb ∈ C a , points M 1 + (Mb − M ) b∈C a ∪Cã e b ; Mbe a ; e a belong to P C ∩ H. Again, the small change in those point coordinates (M a becomes Mb) allows that the Mono inequality involvingã,b ∈ A holds at equality. This yield β a = 0 for all a ∈ A, and the result follows.
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Proposition 11
The Strengthened Mono inequalities
where b * is the arc with the smallest fixed cost in C a ∩ A E , are facet defining for
Proof 11
Let H = (t; p; x) : tã = tb + cb − cb * xb,ã ∈ A,b ∈ C a ∩ A E and assume that the "if" condition holds. For all a ∈ A \ {ã}, points M (1 + b∈A\{ã}:b≤a e b ) + Seã; 0; 0 belong to P C ∩ H if the constant S is so that S = 0 for a <b and S = M for a ≥b. As (M 1; 0; 0) also belongs to P C ∩ H, it follows that
From the first case a <b we conclude that α a = 0 (for a =ã) ; from the second one we deduce αã = −αb and the other index α a = 0. Hence δ = 0.
Considering points M (1 − a∈Cã e a ) + a∈Cã\{b} (cb − cb * )e a ; 0; eb and
Mbeb; eb of P C ∩H yields γb = −(cb −cb * )αã and βb = 0.
Note that the last sums in those point coordinates insure that the given Strengthened Mono inequality is satisfied at equality.
Further, for all a ∈ A \ {b}, points M (1 − b∈C a ∪Cã e b ); 0; e a are in P C ∩ H. Again, imposing t b = 0 for all b ∈ Cã allows that the given Strengthened Mono inequality is satisfied at equality when a is so thatb ∈ C a . This implies γ a = 0 for all a ∈ A \ {b}.
For all a ∈ A \ {b} such thatã,b ∈ C a , one considers points M 1 + (M a − M ) b∈C a e b ; M a e a ; e a of P C ∩ H. Otherwise, i.e. ifb ∈ C a , points M 1 + (Mb − M ) b∈C a ∪Cã e b ; Mbe a ; e a belong to P C ∩ H.
The small change in those points (M a becomes Mb) allows that the given Strengthened Mono inequality holds at equality. Hence β a = 0 and the result follows.
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Proposition 12
The Short inequalities
are facet defining for P C for all sets S such that c a ≥ c b for all b in A \ (S ∪ {a}).
Proof 12
Considering a Short inequality in its generic form, let H be defined as Further, for all a ∈ A \ (S ∪ {ã}), points M (1 − b∈Cã e b − b∈C a \Cã e b ); 0; e a belong to P C ∩ H, which implies γ a = Mãαã. From points M (1 − b∈Cã e b ) + (cã − c a − M ) b∈C a \Cã e b ); (cã − c a )e a ; e a of P C ∩ H, it follows that (cã − c a )β a + γ a = Mãαã, and β a = 0.
For all a ∈ S \{ã}, the points
M a e a ; e a are in
0; e a belongs to P C ∩ H. Hence, (c a − cã)αã + γ a = Mãαã and γ a = M a αã. Otherwise, i.e. if c a < cã, points
(cã − c a )e a ; e a are in P C ∩ H and (cã − c a )β a + γ a = Mãαã. As γ a = −M a β a , we obtain β a = −αã for all a ∈ S \ {ã} and the result follows.
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Now consider the single commodity General Complete Toll NPP, and let us define P as the convex hull of feasible solutions for this problem, i.e.
As P C ⊆ P, we have the following results.
Corollary 1 Dim(P) = 3n. with M a = max{0, c od − c a }, are facet defining for P C .
Corollary 2 Inequalities
Further, this allow us to present a complete description of P. 
with M a = max{0, c od − c a } }. ThenP = P.
Proof 13
Let A = {1, ..., n} be the toll arcs of the network. We define a fractional point ofP as a point ofP with a fractional component x, i.e. there exists i in {1, ..., n} such that 0 < x i < 1. Similarly, an integer point ofP is defined as a point ofP with an integer component x, i.e. x i ∈ {0, 1} for all i in {1, ..., n}.
We have proved that (31)-(34) define facets of P. Now one can show that any fractional point ofP is not extremal. Indeed, let (t;p;x) be a fractional point ofP, where 0 ≤x i ≤ 1 for all i ∈ {1, ..., n} and there exists at least onex i such that 0 <x i < 1. This point can be presented as a convex combination of integer points ofP:
(t;p;x) = i∈{1,...,n}:xi =0x i (t i ; 1 x ip i e i ; e i ) + (1 − 
with s j ∈ R + .
Those integer points belong toP. Indeed, (31)-(33) are clearly satisfied. Next, for the integer points corresponding to i ∈ {1, ..., n}, (34) yields to either t or not, which is ensured by (35). For the last integer point n + 1, the nul components x and p force taxes t n+1 j : j ∈ A to be larger that c od − c j in (34), which is also ensured by the definition (36) of those taxes.
Next, for each j ∈ A, we introduce the set B(j) = i ∈ A :x i = 0,p ī xi + c i − c j > 0 and let s j be such that 
which is equal tot j by definition of B(j).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have addressed instances of a Network Pricing Problem that take into account features specific to a highway topology. A companion paper will use these results to design improved algorithms for tackling the NPP.
